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Abstract: This paper analyzes some of the implications of North American labor
market integration for scal policy. The economies of Canada and the US are both
characterized by highly integrated internal markets for goods and services as well as for
labor and capital, and subnational governments in both economies play an important
role in the nancing and provision of public goods and services, including higher
education. Despite theoretical insights from traditional trade theory that suggest that
\trade and migration are substitutes," labor markets in both the US and Canada
exhibit substantial and persistent interregional migration, with gross migration rates
that greatly exceed net migration rates, especially for highly-educated workers. High
gross migration rates are consistent with the hypothesis that education contributes
to skill-specialization and worker heterogeneity, and that mobility provides a form of
insurance for investment in risky human capital. Mobility also constrains the ability
of competitive governments to engage in redistributive nancing of human capital
investment, and recent trends in both the US and Canada reveal a diminishing level
of nancial support for public-sector institutions by subnational governments. The
implications of labor market integration for the eciency of resource allocation, for
income determination, and for scal competition are important for evaluations of tax
and education policies both at the subnational and at the international levels.
yAn earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on \Social and Labour Market
Aspects of North American Linkages," sponsored by Human Resources Development Canada and
Industry Canada, Montreal, October, 2002. I am grateful to especially E. Beaulieu, M. Lovely, P.
Poutvaara, M. Streams, and conference participants for helpful comments, but retain responsibility
for any errors.\[I]t is a little superuous for any foreigner to come to Rotterdam to lecture about
economics at all. I feel a bit like a 17th century New England smuggler lecturing on
seamanship to Admiral Tromp... I suppose the logic of the situation is that I am not
an import at all; I am to be processed and re-exported, like cocoa beans." R. M.
Solow, on presenting invited lectures in Rotterdam (Solow [1963], p. 7).
1 Introduction
Liberalization of trade in North America has potentially important consequences for
the functioning of labor markets and the development of human resources in this re-
gion. What are the implications of greater economic integration for earnings, earnings
inequality, labor mobility, and human capital investment and nancing? The objec-
tive of this paper is to help to clarify these issues conceptually, to discuss some of
their empirical dimensions, and to suggest some possible implications for policy and
for future research.
Integration of markets for (either, or both) goods and factors of production (dened,
loosely, as a reduction in fundamental barriers to exchange due to broadly-dened
technological change as well as reductions in barriers resulting from liberalization of
policy) has complex eects because it changes the general equilibrium of the entire
economy. Labor markets may be aected directly by technological changes that fa-
cilitate international migration, such as reductions in search and moving costs, or by
policy changes such as those embodied in NAFTA that allow greater international
mobility within North America for purposes of business or otherwise. They can also
be aected indirectly by changes in trade policy, most obviously because of changes in
the sectoral composition of demand and hence through resulting changes in demand
for dierent productive inputs. Perhaps less obviously, changes in trade policy can
lead to changes in the optimal organization of commercial activity, including changes
in the size and scope of rms and the degree of vertical integration of the produc-
tion process, leading in turn to changes in the deployment of managerial, technical,
and scientic human resources across space, including across international boundaries.
Because these eects are potentially highly inter-related, it is useful to consider the
process of economic integration not only in terms of immediate impacts on particular
markets, for example by examining the extent to which international migration ows
change in the short run, or whether these ows aect or are immediately aected by
wages or earnings, tax policy, or other specic variables, but also from a general equi-
librium perspective that recognizes the inter-relationships among markets and among
various spheres of policy. Furthermore, the eects of structural economic change does
1not occur instantaneously, and short-run eects can dier markedly from long-run
eects.
As one simple illustration of these remarks, note that policies that change the rewards
to more or less skilled workers { as NAFTA may well have done, according to studies
cited below { change the incentives for skill acquisition. But the supply response to
these incentives is complex and may well vary over time. For example, in the short run,
many members of the existing work force are unlikely to upgrade their skills or change
their occupational specializations. As a broad generalization, middle-aged and older
workers lacking advanced training seldom have suciently strong incentives to divert
the time and money needed to obtain university educations, mid-career physicists
or nuclear engineers are not likely to have powerful incentives to change careers to
become lawyers or accountants. The strength of these incentives depends partly on real
income dierentials and whether other supply responses { for example, international
migration { limit the incentive to alter the human capital of the existing workforce.
Over time, the supply response will reect the entry of new workers into the labor
force, including young people who, like their predecessors, make choices about the level
and type of investment (whether to attend college, whether to study law, medicine,
mathematics, or history) based on current and prospective market conditions. The
supply response also depends on public policy adjustments, including not only the
overall funding for education at all levels but adjustment, if required, in the types
of instruction oered. In higher education, for example, employment regulations and
traditions make it dicult to shrink the deployment of resources in some areas in
order to expand the availability of resources in other areas. Similarly, capital ows {
across sectors within countries, and across international boundaries { also respond to,
and inuence, ongoing adjustments in the labor market. This adjustment process is
also not instantaneous, and the dynamics of capital adjustment are likely to be highly
inter-related with those of the labor market.
The full complexity of these interactions is obviously beyond the scope of any single
analysis. The present discussion is intended to identify some signicant elements
of the process of economic integration with an eye to understanding some of their
implications for the formation and utilization of human capital.
To begin with, Section 2 reviews some basic theory about linkages between trade and
factor pricing. It is often suggested that liberalization of trade can \substitute" for
geographic integration of factor markets. However, the conditions under which this
is true are not always satised either within or among countries. It is important to
understand the linkage between trade and migration because, as Section 3 shows, in-
ternal migration is a persistent feature of the US and Canadian labor markets. This
section presents a very simple analytical framework which is helpful in understanding
2some of the allocative and distributional eects of internal migration. It also discusses
the high levels of gross migration ows among regions within the US and Canada and
the particular importance of mobility for highly-educated workers, suggesting that the
spatial integration of labor markets is linked to the types of skill-specialization nor-
mally associated with higher education. Section 4 briey reviews the US and Canadian
experience with higher education nance, drawing attention to recent trends in the
funding of higher-education institutions and to the changing roles of national and
subnational governments, and of the private and public sectors in general. Section 5
discusses how the integration of factor markets aects the environment within which
policy is made. Factor mobility means that regions must compete for human and other
resources. Government scal policies aect the allocation of resources among regions,
and, in particular, competition for highly-skilled workers can aect the structure of
government revenue systems. Competition for mobile resources, along with several
other factors, may help to explain some of the recent trends in higher-education -
nance, and may contribute to further evolution of policy in this area, as well as with
respect to tax policy generally. The discussion concludes by noting several major
research questions that await investigation and that are important for arriving at a
more secure foundation for policy analysis.
2 Theoretical Considerations: Trade and Migra-
tion
2.1 Factor-Price Equalization: A Brief Recapitulation
Analysis of the economic impact of international migration within the context of a
broader process of economic integration must quickly come to grips with a powerful
insight from traditional international trade theory: the factor price equalization theo-
rem. According to this theorem, which is one of the textbook results of international
trade theory, the opening up of international trade in goods and services should lead
a country to expand its production in industries that rely heavily on inputs { capital,
labor, natural resources { that are relatively cheap there, and to contract its produc-
tion in industries that use intensively inputs which, in that country, are relatively
costly. Because of their favorable cost structure, rms in the former industries will
be able to compete advantageously against foreign producers, allowing the country to
export those goods and services, whereas the reverse is true for the latter industries:
these will be the industries in which imports from abroad will penetrate the domestic
market, resulting in reduced employment, investment, and output. As this process
3occurs, expansion of the domestic export industries and contraction of the domestic
import-competing industries will result in increased demand for those domestic inputs
that are relatively cheap and reduced demand for those inputs that are relatively ex-
pensive. So, for instance, a country with abundant and therefore comparatively cheap
high-skilled labor will expand production of goods and services that require such la-
bor, relying on imports from abroad to meet the demand for goods and services that
require low-skilled labor. As this happens, the earnings of high-skilled workers in the
domestic market will rise, while the earnings of low-skilled workers will fall. The op-
posite occurs in other countries, driving up the earnings of low-skilled workers and
reducing the earnings of high-skilled workers.
Under some assumptions, principally that countries have access to identical constant-
returns-to-scale production technologies, that markets are perfectly competitive, and
that factors of production can move freely from contracting to expanding industries,
the process of trade should lead to complete international equality of relative factor
prices { factor price equalization. Thus, for instance, the wage per unit of manage-
rial services relative to the wage per unit of blue-collar services should be equalized.
Similarly, the relative return per unit of capital services, the return per eective unit
of land or natural resources, and other factor prices should tend to converge as trade
expands. These are expected to be among the consequences of trade liberalization
policies like NAFTA, or of other political or technological changes that reduce exist-
ing trade barriers.
The factor-price equalization theorem suggests that international trade aects the dis-
tribution of income. Correctly understood, however, factor-price equalization does not
imply that the annual real income per manager or per blue-collar worker is equalized
across countries. Managers or blue-collar workers in one country may embody more or
fewer eective units of their respective skills than workers in another country. Factor
price equalization implies (for example) that if low-skilled workers in one country are
able to produce twice as many units of low-skilled services as workers in another coun-
try, their incomes will be twice as high. This presents a serious challenge for empirical
research, since it is dicult to determine whether (for example) better-educated work-
ers in one country have higher incomes because they embody more units of the same
types of human resources as lower-skilled workers in the same country or whether the
skills that they obtain through education are dierent and more highly-rewarded than
those of less-educated workers.1
1Treer (1993) emphasizes the importance of international dierences in productivity and their
relevance for explaining trade patterns and for testing for factor price equalization { a matter of
considerable importance, since it is known that factor-price equalization can fail when production
technologies dier. The discussion below is agnostic about dierences in technologies among regions,
but it should be noted that productivity-adjusted factor price equalization among regions is fully
4To formulate this distinction more precisely, suppose that production in a particular
industry in country (or region) j uses a combination of capital kj, natural resources
nj, and several dierent types of labor lij, where i = 1;:::m indexes the labor type;
for instance, labor high-skilled labor might be type-1 and low-skilled labor might be
type 2.2 With marginal-productivity factor pricing, and letting pj denote the price of






where fj(), the level of industry output, depends not only on labor inputs but on other
productive resources (capital, natural resources, etc.) as well. In general, the degree
of substitutability between labor of dierent types can range from nil to complete. In
the latter case, the wages of high- and low-skilled workers will dier only because they
possess dierent quantities of skills which are eectively homogeneous { that is, they
have dierent eective labor supplies.
It is worth noting that this special assumption of perfect substitutability { augmented
with the further assumption that labor is the only factor of production so that the
marginal productivity of labor is a technological constant { has been the basis of a
large literature on optimal income taxation, beginning, in its modern form, with the
seminal work of Mirrlees (1971). It also has been a maintained assumption in many
traditional macro growth models, in which, for instance, capital and labor are treated
as the only two inputs in the aggregate production function. In this context, labor
is not treated as the sole input and the degree of substitutability between labor and
capital is one of the important parameters of the model; customarily, an elasticity of
substitution of one (the Cobb-Douglas case) or less is thought to t the data best.
In this respect, growth models oer a richer framework for the analysis of income
distribution because they distinguish between labor and non-labor income. However,
in models where all labor (and labor supply behavior) is homogeneous, changes in
earnings inequality must ultimately be traced to changes in the distribution of the
amount of eective labor services within the working population. In this context, for
instance, an increase in earnings inequality during the 1990s could be attributed to
some combination of an augmentation of the skills of high-skill workers (\experience",
or on-the-job training) and a reduction in the skills of low-skill workers (\depreciation"
of human capital for these workers). A more plausible explanation for changes in the
distribution of earnings, however, is that workers of dierent types are not perfect
consistent with the possibility that workers (or other factors) can increase their incomes by moving
from low- to high-productivity regions.
2Each of these input variables may interpreted, if desired, as a vector, thus allowing for any
number of productive inputs.
5substitutes for one another, at least in the \short run" during which worker skill levels
are treated as exogenously xed.
In any event, whether or not dierent types of labor are perfect substitutes, workers
of the same type in dierent countries are perfect substitutes, by denition. With
free trade and given the other assumptions of the factor-price equalization theorem,
the wage rates of these workers should be the same across countries. In this case,
international dierences in earnings per worker of a given type must be attributed
to dierences in the eective number of units of labor supplied per worker across
countries. Once again, this raises thorny issues for empirical analysis since it is dicult
to determine whether workers with dierent earnings embody dierent amounts of the
same type of labor or dierent types of labor.
While the factor-price equalization theorem is most commonly referenced in the con-
text of international trade, it should be noted that it can be applied, as well, within
countries. Indeed, trade within countries is often fundamentally less costly, and less im-
peded by restrictive policies, than trade among countries. In this context, the theorem
implies that free trade among regions within a country should result in equalization
of factor prices among regions. Internal migration is discussed further below.
2.2 Trade and Migration: Substitutes or Complements?
A famous analysis by Mundell (1957), drawing on classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
trade theory, argues that trade and factor mobility can be substitutes for one another.
The essence of the argument derives from the factor-price equalization theorem: if
trade tends to drive factor prices in dierent countries or regions closer together,
and if factor reallocations across space are driven by factor price dierentials, then
trade can reduce or substitute entirely for factor movements. The rationale for this
argument should be apparent from the foregoing remarks. The economic theory of
factor movements across space rests on the fundamental hypothesis that factor owners
{ workers, in the case of human resources { seek the highest attainable net returns
for the resources that they own.3 Real dierences in net rates of return across regions
create incentives for arbitrage, with workers or capital owing from places where net
rates of return are low to places where they are high.4
3See, e.g., Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) for a recent overview of theoretical and empirical
analysis of migration.
4The \net rates of return" to which factor owners respond should be interpreted carefully: in
cases where factor movements are not costlessly reversible, the rates of return in question should
be understood to be expected utilities over the relevant (possibly endogenously-determined) decision
6The applicability of this analysis is limited, however, for several reasons. Perhaps
most importantly, at least for present purposes, it neglects the spatial structure of fac-
tor markets within countries, which are eectively treated as single points in space.5
When trade occurs, factors of production are reallocated away from contracting in-
dustries in import sectors and toward expanding industries in export sectors. But in
standard trade theory models, these factor reallocations do not occur among spatially-
separated regions since countries { the geographical units of analysis in the standard
model { have no spatial structure. In reality, of course, factor reallocations among in-
dustries within countries do involve spatial reallocations. The most obvious historical
example is the process of urbanization, associated with the development of modern
manufacturing industry and the movement of population from rural to urban areas.
The intersectoral reallocation of productive resources that accompanies international
trade is also, ordinarily, an inter-regional reallocation of resources, as well.
These observations are worth bearing in mind when considering intranational move-
ment of labor and capital. They can help to explain why countries like the US and
Canada are characterized both by liberal conditions for internal trade (there are no
explicit taris on interprovincial or interstate commerce, nor are regulatory impedi-
ments allowed, generally, to interfere with free internal commerce) and by high levels
of internal factor ows, as discussed further below.
Nevertheless, the basic insight that trade aects factor prices is a crucial one. When
applied to human resources, it implies that the return to investment in human capital
is aected by trade: countries that export commodities that are human-capital inten-
sive and import those that can be produced with relatively small amounts of skilled
labor, for example, should experience widening wage dierentials between more-skilled
and less-skilled workers. In recent years, a number of empirical analyses (see further
discussion below) have attempted to nd an explanation for increased dispersion of
wages within the US and Canada, and it appears that a consensus has formed that
\trade", broadly speaking, helps to explain a signicant portion, though not all, of
the widening of wage dierentials within these countries.
horizon, appropriately adjusted for taxes, benets from public goods and services, environmental,
cultural, and other amenities, regulatory treatment, etc. Only in the simplest cases does this reduce
to equalization of instantaneous pecuniary factor returns.
5This is a characterization of the standard theory, in its pure form. Of course many authors
have varied the standard model in order to capture spatial factors. The specic-factors model can
be interpreted in the context of geographically-xed inputs; other studies distinguish regions within
countries and analyze the implications of transportation costs and trade barriers for regions within
countries; a notable example, relevant for the Canadian case, is Melvin (1985). More recently,
Helliwell (1998) discusses internal and external trade at length and provides many more references
to relevant literature.
73 Internal Migration in the US and Canada
This section considers the role of internal migration in the US and Canada. The
economies of both countries span large geographical areas and are characterized by
a high degree of integration of internal markets for goods and services. In view of
the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 2, it is natural to ask whether free
internal trade has obviated any important economic role for internal migration in these
two countries.
As we shall see, labor migration has, on the contrary, historically played a large role
in the economies of the US and Canada, and this important role shows no signs of
diminishing over time. Much internal migration takes the form of \cross-hauling"
of labor, that is, of two-way labor ows among regions. In order to understand the
economic implications of labor mobility and labor market integration, it is important
to develop theoretical explanations for why such migration ows might be observed.
The discussion below emphasizes the potential role of migration as a mechanism for
spatial matching of the supply of and demand for specialized, heterogeneous labor
skills.
3.1 Intersectoral and Spatial Reallocation of Labor
The extent to which \trade and migration are substitutes" can be considered not only
in the context of international trade but within the context of trade within a country.
Indeed, if trade within a country is free and if the other assumptions underlying the
factor-price equalization theorem are satised, it would follow that internal migration
or capital movements would be economically irrelevant, except insofar as workers have
residential preferences that would motivate them to move from one region to another.
In such an economy, a complete prohibition on inter-regional factor movements would
aect neither the distribution of income nor the eciency of resource allocation. In
fact, this logic can be extended down to the lowest level of spatial analysis, leading to
the conclusion that factor movements are always irrelevant so long as the assumptions
of the factor-price equalization theorem are satised.
This reductio ad absurdum draws attention to an implicit assumption in most treat-
ments of the factor-price equalization theorem. While it is explicitly acknowledged
that factor-price equalization requires free intersectoral mobility of factors of produc-
tion, this, in practice, presupposes free spatial mobility of factors. As one classic
illustration of practical importance, consider the gradual shift of production and of
8productive resources from agriculture toward manufacturing (and more recently to-
ward services) in the Canadian and US economies during the past century. Whereas
21.0% of employed workers in the US workforce were engaged in agriculture in 1939,
that percentage had fallen to 2.3% by 2001. This employment shift has been accom-
panied by rural-urban migration and increased urbanization of the population. For
example, 39.6% of the US population lived in urban areas in 1900, with the remainder
in rural areas, 56.1% were urbanized by 1940, and, by 1990, 75.2% of the population
lived in urban areas. Canadian statistics tell a similar story. For example, in 1871,
25.6% of the Canadian population lived in urban areas; by 1901, this gure had risen
to 37.4%; in 1941, 54.3% of the population was urbanized, and by 1996 the urban
population had increased to 77.9% of the total. As in the US case, growing urbaniza-
tion was accompanied by intersectoral shifts of labor away from agriculture. In 1881,
48.1% of the workforce was engaged in agriculture, a gure that fell to 40.2% in 1901,
to 25.8% in 1941, and, by 1996, to 3.3%.
More generally, labor and capital mobility { spatial as well as, and as part of, intersec-
toral resource mobility { have been of critical importance in the economic development
of both the US and the Canadian economies throughout their histories. Trade within
these economies has of course been subject to some restrictions due to regulatory and
other policies (as has been true as well of the mobility of labor and capital), but both
economies stand out, by world and historical standards, for their high degree of inter-
nal free trade over large geographical areas. Their experience provides strong evidence
to suggest that trade and factor mobility are not highly substitutable but in fact can
coexist for long periods of time.
3.2 Modeling Internal Migration
Why is internal migration a persistent feature of the Canadian and US labor markets?
No doubt many factors are at work, but the natural starting point for analysis {
and a standard one, in the literature (see, e.g., Topel (1985)) { is to suppose that
internal migration is driven by the desire of migrants to achieve higher levels of real
income. The real income enjoyed by a worker in a region depends rst and foremost
on employment conditions there, for which real wages provide a convenient summary
indicator.
As discussed previously, the assumptions of the factor-price equalization theorem must
be invalid for wages to dier among regions within a country. Empirically, it is well-
known that real wages can, indeed, dier among regions for specic types of labor. For
example, prolonged net East-West migration in the US (essentially during the entire
920th century) has resulted in signicant reallocation of labor from relatively low-wage
to relatively high-wage regions. The \great migration" of black workers from the
southern US to northern and midwestern cities during the period 1930{1960 reects
a movement from low-wage agricultural employment to higher-wage manufacturing-
sector jobs. These major trends demonstrate the existence of real wage dierentials
and their fundamental importance for major demographic shifts through internal mi-
gration. They suggest that the productivity of labor of specic types can vary over time
and among regions because of technological change (e.g., changes in cotton-harvesting
technology) and because of changes in domestic or world demand conditions that af-
fect prices, desired output levels, and associated derived labor demands. Diminishing
returns to labor inputs within a geographic area can arise because of the presence
of locationally xed or quasi-xed factors. These include land and other natural re-
sources, but also the stock of public infrastructure (highway systems, port facilities,
water/gas/electricity distribution networks) which, even if variable in the long run, is
often very slow to change. Some types of private xed capital investments are also
quite long-lived, as are quasi-public entities like major educational institutions and
related research centers.
The presence of xed or quasi-xed inputs in the production process has far-reaching
implications for the allocation of labor and the determination of wage rates. A simple
and familiar diagrammatic illustration can convey the main points. Let the horizontal
axis of Figure 1 measure the quantity of labor of a particular type i in a particular
region j; for simplicity, and without loss of important generality, assume that each
worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor, so that the quantity of labor is equivalent
to the number of workers of the specied type. Suppose that the region in question
is small, relative to the rest of the domestic economy, in the sense that an increase or
decrease in employment in this region has only a small impact on the real incomes of
workers of this type in the rest of the economy, given by wi in the gure. The demand
for labor of type i in region j, as given in (1), depends on the amounts of other inputs
in the region, the technology of production, and the price of the output produced by
these workers, all of which, in general, vary over time.6 Let lij denotes the number
of workers initially located in the region. If migration into or out of the region is
costless, then the region will experience immigration or emigration of workers of type
i depending on the values of local demand determinants. If migration is impossible
(innitely costly), then local demand conditions will determine the equilibrium local
wage.
6The amounts of other variable inputs depends on their prices, and thus the demand for type-i
labor depends on other input prices as well as on the quantities of other xed inputs. Assuming that
the region is small in all relevant markets, the prices of other inputs are parametrically given and
thus can be subsumed within the other data of the problem.
10Figure 1 illustrates two possible situations, one with high demand for type-i labor,
represented by D
+
ij, and one with low demand, represented by D
 
ij. These demands
may reect dierent values of output prices on world markets, dierent degrees of
protectionist trade policies (e.g., a tari on imports of the goods produced with type-i
labor in the high-demand case, free trade in the low-demand case), dierent states
of technology, or dierent levels of complementary inputs such as public or private
capital investment. When labor is costlessly mobile, the equilibrium quantity of em-




ij in the gure. The
dierence between local demand and the initial endowment of labor l
+
ij  lij represents
net immigration of type-i labor in the high-demand state, while lij   l
+
ij represents
the outow of this labor type in the low-demand situation. The equilibrium wage is
xed at wi by external market conditions, independently of the level of local demand.
When labor is completely immobile, the equilibrium level of employment is xed at
lij and no migration can occur, but the equilibrium local wage rate varies with local
demand, for example from w
+
ij in the high-demand situation to w
 
ij in the low-demand
situation.
This simple diagram illustrates the crucial role of xed or quasi-xed inputs in giving
rise to diminishing returns to labor in a particular location, and in showing how factor
mobility, in this case the mobility of labor, plays a crucial role in the equalization of
factor prices among regions. Of course, migration costs may limit the extent to which
local employment responds to varying local demand conditions { as indeed is illustrated
most clearly in the case where migration costs are so high as to be prohibitive. In this
case, local wages vary in accordance with local labor market demand conditions, rather
than being determined entirely by external market conditions. But to the extent that
labor can move among regions, wages { or, to be more accurate, real incomes { will
tend to be equalized across space.
Note from this simple analysis that labor mobility contributes to the eciency of
resource allocation because workers move toward regions where they are more produc-
tive and away from regions where they are less productive. Labor mobility, in other
words, is productivity enhancing. This point is well-known. For example, Hamilton
and Whalley (1984) use a CGE model of the world economy in which labor is treated
as a homogeneous factor of production. They estimate that free international mobility
of labor would increase world output and real income by an amount approximately
equal to world GDP. To this writer's knowledge, a similar calculation has not been
made to illustrate how much labor mobility has contributed to the growth of US or
Canadian GDP, although, in principle, this is not a dicult exercise. There is every
reason to think that labor mobility makes a major contribution to the ecient func-
tioning of North American labor markets, especially when the heterogeneity of labor
11is taken into account.7
3.3 Internal Migration: Why Are Gross Flows So Large?
While net migration among regions or countries is often a focus of attention for pol-
icymakers and analysts, the net movement of labor among regions in the US and
Canada are the results of gross ows in opposite directions that are often much larger
{ frequently, by an order of magnitude { than the net ows.
Tables 1{3 draw on recent Canadian census data. Table 1 shows 5-year migration by
province and for the country as a whole, for the Census years of 1991 and 1996.8 Table
2 presents the same data, expressed as percentages. Table 3 presents 1-year migration
levels and rates for 1996 alone.
Looking rst at the data in Tables 1 and 2 for 1996, we see that 43% of Canadi-
ans \moved", i.e., changed addresses, during the period 1991-1996. Many of these
movers, however, stayed in the same municipal area (strictly, Census subdivision,
CSD), and hence are classied as \non-migrants". Most of these non-migrants pre-
sumably changed residences but, if in the workforce, continued to participate in the
same local labor market. \Migrants", on the other hand, lived in dierent municipal
areas, or outside of Canada, 5 years previously; of these, approximately 3% lived in a
dierent province and thus are classied as inter-provincial migrants. This means that
gross inter-provincial migration, i.e., the sum of in- and out-migration for all provinces
excluding international migration, amounted to 6% of the national population. The
amount of migration varies substantially by province; unsurprisingly, in-migration to
the two largest provinces, in absolute terms, was larger than for any other provinces
but was comparatively modest in proportional terms, amounting to only 1-3% of the
provincial population; corresponding gures for other provinces were generally in the
5{7% range. One would expect, of course, that the larger provinces would exhibit
7Topel (1986) shows that migration behavior is largely explained by the prospect of higher earn-
ings. Topel (1991) shows that job mobility (i.e., job changes) accounts for a signicant part of
earnings growth over the life cycle. Job mobility is not identical to migration, but is certainly corre-
lated with it. An analysis that links migration to earnings growth over the life cycle would provide
considerable insight into the productivity gains generated by migration, and could provide the basis
for an estimate of how much productivity and income the US or Canadian economies would lose if
internal migration were curtailed.
8For further discussion and analysis of interprovincial migration by both native and immigrant
Canadians, see Edmonston (2002). Edmonston nds that immigrants to Canada have higher rates
of interprovincial migration than native Canadians, but that their migration patterns are otherwise
broadly similar to natives.
12lower levels of interprovincial migration on account of their size. It is noteworthy,
for example, that the proportion of all \migrants" in Ontario and Quebec are quite
close to the national average, and that intraprovincial migration rates were relatively
high for these two provinces; less-populous provinces generally exhibit higher rates of
interprovincial migration and lower rates of intraprovincial migration.
The data for the 5-year period 1986-1991 are broadly similar but reveal somewhat
higher levels of population movement than in the more recent period. Once again,
while interprovincial migrants account for a comparatively small fraction of the pop-
ulations of Ontario and Quebec, the total share of migrants in these provinces is
quite close to the national average, again reecting their large size. Both in 1991 and
1996, immigration from outside the country was about as large as the total amount
of interprovincial migration.
Table 3 presents similar gures for 1996, but now showing only the amount of mi-
gration that occurs within a single year. All of the gures in this table are of course
signicantly smaller than for the 5-year data in Tables 1 and 2. Qualitatively speaking,
however, the one-year data are generally similar to those in the 5-year tables.
Tables 4 and 5 present data on migration in the US. In this case, the data are presented
at the level of the four Census regions, each region including a number of individual
states. The total populations of these regions are approximately 2-3 times the size
of the total Canadian population. These tables present data on annual migration
ows for selected years, and are therefore perhaps most comparable to Table 3. These
gures reveal that the US is also characterized by a high level of internal migration.
In this case, the data explicitly separate in- and out-migration, as well as reporting
net migration ows. Annual in- and out-migration rates are generally in the range
of 1{1.75%, with gross migration rates (i.e., combined in- and out-migration rates)
generally ranging from 2{3.25%. Net migration rates must of course be smaller, by
denition, than gross migration rates, but the data in Table 5 show that the magnitude
of the dierence is quite substantial: gross ows often exceed net ows by a factor of
10 or more, and in almost no cases exceed them by less than a factor of 4.
In the US as in the Canadian case, these data could be reported at dierent levels of
spatial aggregation, such as at the level of states or metropolitan areas. As one moves
to smaller spatial units, migration rates rise. For example, in 1999-2000, a total of
16.0% of the US population changed location; of these, only 0.6% were movers from
abroad, 6.3% moved from one state to another, 9.0% moved to a dierent county
within the same state, and 9.0% moved from one place to another within the same
county. For the same year, the nation's metropolitan areas experienced internal in-
migration of 2.0 million people, out-migration of 1.9 million, net internal in-migration
13of .1 million, and immigration from abroad of 1.6 million. Note, again, that net
internal migration is very small relative to gross migration ows. No doubt much (but
not all) relocation at the most disaggregated level (within counties) is accounted for
by changes in residence rather than by changes in employment, and even at the level
of census regions a certain proportion of moves may involve no change in employment.
Nevertheless, it is evident from these data { which, as in the Canadian case, reect
long-standing migration patterns that have persisted at least since World War II {
that there are high levels of internal migration in the US that involve changes either
in employment status (school to work, work to retirement, etc.) or in location of
employment. Furthermore, and very importantly, the high levels of gross relative to
net migration reveal that there is a great deal of \cross-hauling" of labor: workers in
the \East" move to the \West" while workers from the \West" move to the \East".
The high levels of gross internal migration in the US and Canada show convincingly
that free internal trade has not eliminated internal migration. In addition, they suggest
that labor cannot be accurately characterized as a homogeneous factor of production
over time horizons of years or decades. Large and largely osetting ows of labor into
and out of local labor markets is indicative of a sorting or matching process in which
workers search for and nd \better" { i.e., higher-productivity and higher-real-wage {
jobs in other markets, a process which inevitably involves search and relocation costs
that could be avoided if existing workers in local markets lled these jobs. The fact
that this does not occur means that local workers are less satisfactory matches for
local jobs, in many instances, than workers from other regions.9 In turn, this implies
that \large" labor markets are productivity enhancing.
3.4 Gross Migration and Skill Specialization
Of course, mobility is not equally productivity-enhancing for all workers. Empiri-
cally, highly educated workers (especially young ones) migrate with greater frequency
than lower-skilled workers. This has long been known in the literature. For example,
Ehrenberg and Smith (1988, p. 360) observe that age is the most important deter-
minant of migration, with young people moving more than old, and that \education
9Alternatively, the US and Canadian economies are characterized by a large and persistent volume
of costly and wasteful migration. Wildasin and Wilson (1996) develop a model in which local gov-
ernments, acting in the interests of owners of immobile local resources (e.g., property owners) pursue
policies that generate such migration in equilibrium. As noted in that analysis, prot-maximizing
rms might well pursue wage policies that produce inecient labor turnover in order to exercise
dynamic \monopsony power". This argument does not, however, provide a convincing explanation
for \long distance" relocation of workers.
14is the single best indicator of who will move within an age group. ... [C]ollege
education ... raises the probability of migrating the most" (emphasis in original). A
number of recent studies examine the movement of highly-educated workers. Bound
et al. (2001) nd that states with higher-educational institutions that produce many
educated graduates may employ such workers at a somewhat higher rate than other
states, but that the rate of employment of highly-educated workers is not strongly
linked to the number of such workers produced in a state. Kodrzycki (2001) nds that
college graduates are more mobile than others, as expected, and that net migration
of such individuals is substantially smaller than the amount of gross migration. For
example, as shown in Table 6, whereas over 6% of those with at least a college-level
education move among Census Divisions (which divide the US into 9 areas) each year,
the corresponding gure is just over 4% for high-school graduates and even lower for
those with less than a high-school education. The gures in Table 7 show that about
25% of college graduates move across Census Divisions within a 5-year period, with
gross migration ows that are much higher than net ows. Interestingly, this is true
whether migration is dened relative to high school location (presumably an indicator
of \home" region) or relative to college location (which, for some people, might be a
\sojourn" away from a home region), indicating that job-related moves are indeed of
considerable importance for highly-educated people.
Given the higher degree of specialization that is normally associated with high levels
of education, this is perhaps not surprising. To take an example from higher education
in economics, a university that seeks to hire a faculty member to teach (say) monetary
economics may search over a large geographic area, possibly the entire world, in order
to nd a candidate with the desired skill attributes. Hiring a labor economist from
a nearby university might save some moving costs, but a labor economist is not a
good substitute for a monetary economist. In fact, a university that hires a monetary
economist from another, distant university may at the same time nd that another
distant university, or perhaps even the same one, will successfully recruit a faculty
member from its own history or physics department. The net migration ows among
universities in a given year may thus be rather modest even while signicant gross
migration occurs. The explanation for the \cross-hauling" of labor, in this case, is
to be found in the fact that employers are seeking workers to meet quite specialized
demands, and that workers that can perform the required specialized tasks are not
good substitutes for each other.
The notion that specialization is related to the size of a market is well known in eco-
nomics (Smith, 1776, Book I, Chapter 3). Perhaps most commonly, economic analysis
has focused on the size of goods markets (e.g., Stigler (1951)) and its implications
for industry structure, but the size of factor markets can in principle be important
15as well. The \size" of a labor or capital market may be dened in dierent ways;
presumably, the key characteristic of a \large" market is the presence of numerous
buyers and sellers, and, as pointed out by Krugman (1991) and others, the creation of
large markets may be one of the important forces behind agglomerative forces leading
to urbanization. However, the observed continuing migration ows of highly-skilled
workers in osetting directions indicates a possible link between specialization of work-
ers and labor markets that are large in a spatial sense. Indeed, it is quite possible
that specialization in goods and services markets is complementary to specialization in
the acquisition of skills, especially those skills that are acquired early in life involving
investments in human capital that are not readily reversible.
To illustrate this idea, consider the decision to invest in highly specialized medical
training and facilities, such as those needed to carry out kidney-pancreas transplants.
According to the Scientic Registry of Transplant Recipients (2001), a total of 911
kidney-pancreas transplants were undertaken in the US in 2000. These procedures
were performed at a total of 91 dierent facilities throughout the country, but only 30
of these facilities performed 10 or more. There were 4 facilities in California at which
10 or more transplants were performed; in no other state were there more than 2 such
facilities.10
There are many risks associated with the assembly and utilization of the productive
resources needed to provide such specialized medical services. Those who invest non-
human capital in specialized medical facilities of this type clearly take some risk, since
the ability to sta and utilize such a facility \protably" over the investment planning
horizon cannot be guaranteed.11 Many of the risks confronting these investors can,
however, be pooled through nancial markets, within the organizational structure of a
hospital or consortium of health-care providers, or by other means, thus reducing the
cost of these risks and their deterrent to undertaking investment in the rst place.12
Because many institutions exist to help manage the risks facing those who invest non-
human capital in specialized uses, the cost of these risks may be relatively small. By
comparison, individuals contemplating investment in the human capital required to
work at very specialized tasks face potentially much more costly risks, since their life-
10The most performed at any one location was 47; those performing 10 or more accounted for 553,
or approximately 60%, of all such procedures. Kidney transplants are considerably more common
than combined kidney-pancreas transplants, which in turn are more common than transplantation
of the pancreas alone. In these other cases, as well, a large proportion of procedures are carried out
at comparatively few locations.
11Even not-for-prot institutions face at least a long-run survival or break-even constraint.
12One of the risks facing those who invest in specialized medical facilities { that of not being able
to sta the facility adequately { is mitigated, to some degree, by the option to engage in nation-wide
or even international search for new or replacement personnel.
16time earnings streams cannot readily be insured. The ability to relocate may help to
reduce some of this costly risk. For example, suppose that a pancreas-kidney trans-
plant specialist's rst job is at a transplant center in (say) Missouri. Conceivably, this
will be the best possible lifetime employment match for this specialist. Over a working
lifetime of three or four decades, however, the possibility exists that local employment
conditions could deteriorate (perhaps the transplant center is mismanaged, funding is
inadequate, or local regulatory policies become excessively burdensome) or that new
and better opportunities could arise somewhere else. In the case of this specialized
form of medical practice, as we have seen, \somewhere else" usually means \in a dif-
ferent state" (or country). For these and other specialized workers, restrictions on
geographic mobility can magnify costly lifetime earnings risks.13 Similarly, the oppor-
tunity to search for job opportunities in a large market over the entire life cycle aects
incentives for workers to develop their human capital over time. For instance, the
prospect of searching for new jobs in a large market raises the incentive for medical
(or other) specialists to hone their technical skills on an ongoing basis in occupations
where their skills might otherwise depreciate rapidly because of rapid technological
change. It can also provide an incentive to acquire managerial and organizational
skills that may well be of greatest value in organizations elsewhere, either at \start-
up" facilities that need to assemble an entire team or at existing ones that look to the
outside market for \fresh blood."
For these and other reasons, the possibility of participating in a large, geographically-
dispersed market aects the incentives to acquire, maintain, develop, and utilize spe-
cialized skills. The timing and frequency with which any individual will nd it ad-
vantageous to exercise the \exit option" may depend on many idiosyncratic factors,
but a life-cycle pattern of employment characterized by occasional job switching and
relocation would arise naturally in such an environment.14
The eciency and distributional consequences of the workings of integrated labor mar-
kets are, in principle, rather complex. Most fundamentally, however, integrated labor
13A specialized worker with few outside employment options may confront monopsony exploitation,
which, properly speaking, is not a risk but a type of hold-up problem (cf. Wildasin-Wilson (1996)).
Intersectoral competition for young workers would still require the monopsonist to oer a lifetime
earnings stream that is as attractive as any alternative. But the same basic obstacles to the insurance
of lifetime earnings { costly verication/moral hazard as well as prohibitions on indenture { mean, in
practice, that an irreversible investment in specialized skills faces a riskier return over the life cycle
when the range of future employment opportunities is narrow.
14Riddell and Sweetman (1999), analyzing a sample of Canadian workers, nd that there is a
substantial earnings premium for workers who assert that their job is \closely related" to their eld
of study. This suggests that workers whose specialized skills are well-matched with their employment
are more productive and that there is a substantial loss of productivity associated with working in
jobs that do not utilize specic skills.
17markets contribute to (i) more ecient utilization of the existing stocks of specialized
human capital, (ii) reduced costs of risk associated with investment in the acquisition
of specialized skills, and thus (cet. par.) (iii) greater incentives to invest in such
skills.15 A reduction in risk, ex ante, corresponds to a reduction in inequality within
skill groups, ex post. The overall distributional eects of greater market integration,
such as the impact on the relative earnings of high- and low-skilled workers, on the
returns to immobile natural resources, or on the return to capital, are much more
dicult to ascertain.
Many of these ideas are easily illustrated using Figure 1.16 Suppose that the two
demand curves shown there represent the future demand for specialized labor of type
i in region j in dierent states of the world. For example, consider a young person who
has acquired specialized legal training in the eld of intellectual property rights (labor
of type i) and is initially employed in New York City (region j). In the future, demand
for this person's particular skills may be very high in New York City, but it may also
be relatively low as greater demands arise in other locations, e.g., Washington, DC
(home of the Patent and Trademark Oce), Silicon Valley, Redmond, Washington,
or Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. If workers of this type could not move
freely between New York and other locations, their specialized skills would produce
high earnings (w
+
ij) in high-demand states of the local labor market but low earnings
(w
 
ij) in other cases { i.e., future earnings would be risky. For the employers of such
workers, incomes would also, in general, vary with the state of the world. As Figure 1
happens to be drawn, with demand curves that dier among states of the world solely
by a vertical shift, the income accruing to the owners of the (other) immobile resources
(e.g., general partners in major New York law rms) would be state-invariant, given
by the equal-sized triangles A+Bw
+
ij in the high-demand state and A Cw
 
ij in the
low-demand state. In this admittedly special case, all income risk is borne by workers
of type i, and no income risk is borne by the owners of the other productive resources.
Now compare this with the polar opposite case where labor of type i is costlessly mobile
among regions. To keep the example simple, suppose that the high- and low-demand
states shown in Figure 1 are equally probable, that the wage facing type-i workers in





is a simple average of the high and low wages shown in the gure.17 In this case, it is
easily seen from the gure that type-i workers would move into region j in the high-
15These ideas have been developed more formally in Wildasin (2000).
16The following discussion draws on Wildasin (1995).
17None of these specic assumptions are essential; the key point is that demand for labor of a
particular type is not perfectly correlated across all regions. If it were, there would be no incentive
for labor to move among regions; since we are now exploring the implications of observed internal
migration, situations where such migration would not occur are not of interest.
18demand state of the world, with employment increasing to l
+
ij; high demand, in this
case, produces a quantity adjustment but no price adjustment. In the low-demand
state, workers leave region j, with employment falling to l
 
ij. In both states, workers
receive the same income as that prevailing elsewhere in the economy, namely, wi.
This is the same as the average or expected wage in the case where these workers are
immobile. However, their income is now state-invariant whereas previously it varied
with the state of the world. The owners of the immobile resources now receive income
equal to A+Fwi in the high-demand state and A Dwi in the low-demand state. Note
that the expected income of the immobile factor owners is now higher, by the amount
DEC +BEF, but their income, which previously was state-invariant, is now risky. In
short, labor mobility in this example completely shifts the distribution of income risk
from workers to owners of immobile resources, it leaves unchanged the average income
of workers, and it raises the expected or average income of immobile resource owners.
Note that the high- and low-demand situations portrayed in Figure 1 can also illustrate
a situation where there are diering demand conditions in two dierent regions. In one
region, local industries using type-i workers are ourishing, while in the other region,
such workers are in low demand. The movement of these workers from one region to
the other then gives rise to the eciency gain represented by the two triangles DEC
and BEF. While one region thus attracts workers of one type, that same region
may be in the opposite situation with respect to workers of other types { i.e., even
as one or more local industries may be increasing their employment of workers with
one type of skill (say, a particular type of legal services), others may be shedding
workers with a dierent type of skill (say, a particular type of medical training). Such
a region would exhibit a level of gross migration in excess of net migration; in fact,
it, and other regions, might experience no net migration whatsoever even as workers
of dierent types move from regions where their skills are in low demand to regions
where the enjoy better employment opportunities. Note, however, that such gross
migration is still eciency-enhancing, even if it does not result in any net migration.
For this reason, an analysis that treats all labor as homogeneous will underestimate the
eciency gains from labor mobility. Low levels of net migration would be estimated
to yield little if any productivity gains, whereas the productivity gains from mobility
could be very large if internal migration results in large but osetting gross migration.
This latter case seems to typify the US and Canadian labor markets.
This simple analysis shows that (a) there are eciency gains from the free mobility
of labor (aggregate expected or average income goes up), (b) free mobility tends to
equalize real incomes within a given skill or occupational category across regions, (c)
the distribution of these eciency gains may accrue to resources other than mobile
workers, and (d) free mobility of labor can alter the distribution of income risk among
19dierent factors of production. In the example illustrated in Figure 1, free mobility of
labor reduces (in fact eliminates) the variability of earnings for type-i workers without
aecting expected earnings. It follows that acquisition of the specialized skills needed
to become that type of worker is a more attractive investment for risk-averse workers,
assuming, as is reasonable, that they are not able to insure their future earnings. In
other words, the mobility of specialized labor inuences not only the eciency of uti-
lization of a labor force with given skills, but the incentives to invest in the acquisition
of specialized human capital in the rst place. Persistently high levels of internal mi-
gration by highly-educated workers within the US and Canadian labor markets, with
gross ows among regions going in opposite directions, suggest that local industries in
these economies are subject to continuously changing conditions that result in shifting
demands for workers in dierent occupational or skill categories. Highly-integrated
markets providing relocation options over the life cycle aect both the expected life-
cycle return on investment in specialized human capital and its riskiness, and thus the
demand for higher education and other opportunities for skill acquisition.
4 Higher Education in the US and Canada
Riddell (2001) provides a useful survey of the educational systems of Canada, the
US, and other OECD countries.18 As one might have anticipated, both Canada and
the US stand out as countries with high levels of education, at least measured in
terms of readily-quantiable and comparable indicators. Of particular interest for the
present discussion, expenditures on post-secondary education amount to about 2.5%
of GDP in both countries (1995 data), as compared with the OECD average of 1.3%.
Of people aged 25{64, 19% of Canadians and 27% of US residents have completed
university education, as compared with only 14% for OECD countries as a whole;
Canada actually leads the OECD countries with over 25% having completed some
form of post-secondary (including non-university) education.
In both the US and Canada, subnational governments, principally at the provincial
and state levels, are heavily involved in the provision of higher education through
public-sector higher education institutions. In both countries, the public sector is
also involved in the nancing of higher education, partly through direct and indirect
subsidization of public institutions of higher education but also through direct and
indirect subsidies to students (or to their families).
18See also Riddell and Sweetman (1999).
20Taking the US rst, note from Figures 2, 3, and 4 that the four most important
sources of nance for degree-granting institutions of postsecondary education in the
US during the past two decades have been state governments, payments of tuition
and fees by students, \sales and services," and revenues from the Federal government
(see National Center for Education Statistics (2002) and Barbett and Korb (1999) for
further discussion). As seen in Figure 2, the rst two of these account for about half
of all revenues, with funding from state governments declining from 30.7% of the total
in 1980 to 23.1% by 1995 as tuition and fees rose from 21.0% to 27.9%. (Both of these
trends were monotonic.) \Sales and services" consistently account for approximately
20% of all revenues over this period; about half of this total represents revenue from
university hospitals. The Federal government provided 14.9% of university revenue
at the beginning of this period, a share that declined slightly to 12.1% by the end of
the period. Figures 3 and 4 provide similar data for public and private institutions,
respectively. The most noteworthy dierence between the two is the role of state gov-
ernment nancing, which declined from about 45% to about 35% of all revenues for
public institutions during the period 1980{1996 while constituting a tiny share of the
nancing of private institutions. For public institutions, the (monotonically) falling
share of state government funding was oset by a rising share of tuition and fees,
which grew (monotonically) from 12.9% of revenues in 1980 to 19.0% in 1996. For
private institutions, tuition and fees also rose during this period, from 36.6% to 43.0%;
for these institutions, revenues from the Federal government fell by about 5 percent-
age points and revenues from sales and services fell by about 2 percentage points.19
The most important trend revealed by these gures is that direct public sector pay-
ments to colleges and universities, particularly expenditures by state governments,
are dwindling in relative importance over time. In 1980, the Federal, state, and local
governments together accounted for about 48% of the revenues of all higher-education
institutions, whereas by 1995 this share had fallen to 38%. In this respect, public
sector involvement in the provision of higher education has fallen substantially.
The fact that tuition and fees are rising in importance relative to direct support for
higher education institutions does not imply that public-sector nancing for higher
19No short statement about the nancing of higher education can do justice to its many complex-
ities. As just one example: while tuition and fees were increasing on the \revenue" side, so were
university \expenditures" for nancial aid to students { though the latter less than fully osets the
former. Furthermore, while increases in endowment income or unrestricted gifts clearly increase the
resources at the disposal of universities, it is not at all clear that the same can be said for grants,
contracts, and restricted gifts. For example, a hypothetical $10 million grant from the government to
build a $12 million cyclotron would require a $2 million contribution from other university resources
and might thus conceivably be viewed as a \net loss." How to draw the boundaries between revenues
and expenditures and how to determine the \net income" from grants, contracts, hospital services,
athletics, etc. are very dicult problems both at a conceptual and at a practical level.
21education in general is declining. For instance, the Federal and state governments pro-
vide grants and loans to students to defray the cost of higher education; these outlays
account for a portion of tuition and fees. In addition, there are special provisions in
the tax law, particularly at the Federal level, that allow for tax-sheltered saving for
higher education. The not-for-prot status of colleges and universities allows them to
avoid direct taxation, and they generally qualify as institutions that can receive tax-
deductible contributions from individuals or businesses. Government subsidization of
health care for the poor, elderly, or other groups assists medical schools and hospitals
managed by higher-education institutions. Finally, and presumably not least, the tax-
ation of earnings provides some special advantages for investment in human capital.
Once education is completed, the government captures a portion of the return to ed-
ucation through taxes on earnings and consumption, thus reducing the net return to
investment in education. Taxes also reduce the cost of investment in human capital,
however, most notably because the cost of foregone earnings is expensed rather than
depreciated, unlike the cost of investment in non-human capital. If earnings (or con-
sumption) were taxed at a uniform rate at all points in the life cycle and if there were
no other tax distortions in the economy, tax policy would be neutral in its impact on
incentives to invest in human capital, and thus be more favorable than the tax treat-
ment of investment in non-human capital (at least those investments in non-human
capital that are not tax-sheltered or tax-favored in some other way).20 To this au-
thor's knowledge, no adequate measurements exist of of the full extent of all of these
subsidies for higher education, some of which are highly implicit. It appears, however,
that public-sector for higher education has been shifting away from direct support to
public-sector institutions and toward support for individuals obtaining higher educa-
tion, with Federal support, especially through the tax system, growing in importance
relative to support from state governments.
In very general terms, public sector involvement in Canada exhibits many of the same
features as the US. In 1999-2000, total university expenditures in Canada amounted
to about $14.1 bn. As shown in Table 8, the combined contributions of the Federal,
provincial, and local governments accounted for more than half of all university rev-
enues during the mid- to late-1990s, with provincial governments taking the lead role.
A direct comparison with US data is quite problematic because of possible dierences
in accounting conventions and in the population of institutions included in the data;
thus, for example, \Sales of services and products" amount to less than 10% of uni-
versity revenues in Canada, but this may well reect (as one of several possibilities)
20It should be noted, however, that to the extent that earnings are taxed at progressive rates over
the life cycle, this tax preference for investment in human capital is oset or possibly more than
oset. On the other hand, sales taxes and especially the payroll tax are important components of
the overall tax structure which do not have progressive rate structures.
22dierences in the accounting for revenues accruing to university-related health-care
providers. For present purposes, it is of much greater interest to note that direct
provincial government support for universities declined markedly in relative impor-
tance during the period 1994{1999, from 53.3% to 45.3% of revenues { bringing the
total government share from 62.8% down to 55.0% in a brief period of time. Student
fees rose from 16.0% to 19.3% of revenues during the same period, a large increase in
proportionate terms though still well below the corresponding (if not fully comparable)
gures for the US.
As in the US, the Canadian public sector contributes directly and indirectly to the
nancing of higher education in many ways other than through direct support for
institutions of higher education. Publicly-nanced loans and scholarships are available
for students, tenable at private as well as public institutions; these institutions may
be located in Canada but also may be foreign institutions.21 Federal and provincial
tax systems alter the incentives to invest in human capital in ways similar to those
described above for the US.
The key conclusions to draw from this brief description of education nance in the US
and Canada are the following. First, in both countries, subnational governments have
played a very important role in direct support to institutions of higher education. This
role is declining over time, however, relative to other sources of nancing. The change
in the structure of nancing is partly a change in the nature of the aid recipient
{ i.e., to an increasing extent, the student or the student's family rather than the
higher-education institution { and partly a change in the level of government that
is providing the explicit and implicit aid { i.e., a shift toward increased reliance on
higher-level relative to lower-level governments.
5 Labor Market Integration and Fiscal Competi-
tion in North America
The economies of Canada and the US are highly internally integrated; both have been
characterized by very liberal internal trade conditions for a long period of time. As
the discussion of Section 3 makes clear, labor markets in the US and Canada are
also highly internally integrated, characterized, as they are, by persistent migration
ows over large regions (provinces, states, Census regions). Both countries have highly
educated labor forces, by world standards, and the level of educational attainment has
21For example, the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP) provides assistance to students
attending approved non-Canadian colleges and universities, such as the University of Kentucky.
23risen steadily over the course of the past century. Internal migration options seem to
be particularly important for highly educated individuals. Capital markets are also
highly integrated within these countries.
The economies of the US and Canada are also, to some degree, integrated with each
other, and with respect to the rest of the world. There has long been a high volume
of trade between these two economies, and recent policy initiatives { notable, NAFTA
{ strengthen the opportunities to continue and expand trade. The mobility of capital
and labor between Canada and the US is also relatively high, and it is partly a matter
of policy choice whether to increase or decrease the integration of labor and capital
markets. Although ows of labor go in both directions across the US-Canada border,
Canada has experienced negative net migration vis-a-vis the US, a fact that has led
some, in Canadian policy debates, to express concern about a North-South \brain
drain." Borjas' (1993) analysis indicates that Canada attracted migrants from the US
during the 1970s and 1980s who tended to earn less than native Canadians whereas
Canadians migrating to the US tend to enjoy higher earnings than US natives. It is
of interest to note, however, that Borjas nds that migrants going in either direction
tended to have higher amounts of education than destination-country natives { another
indication, perhaps, of the heterogeneity of high-skilled workers. Several analysts have
observed that the amount of North-South migration is now lower than was formerly
the case; Helliwell (1999), for instance, notes that the number of Canadians residing
in the US has been steadily falling over time. Finnie (2001) notes that the move-
ment of highly-skilled workers from Canada to the US has been relatively modest, in
some respects, and has also been concentrated in particular occupational groups (e.g.,
physicians), suggesting that policy responses to such mobility, if any, might best be
targeted at particular sectors of the economy. Coulson and Devoretz (1993) nd that
immigrants to Canada have brought considerable amounts of human capital into the
country, though immigration restrictions reduced human capital inows substantially
between about 1970 and the late 1980s. Of course, the original brain drain literature
(e.g., Bhagwati and Partington (1976)) was concerned precisely with the fact that de-
veloped countries like the US and Canada were net recipients of human capital from
less-developed countries. Both the US and Canada continue to be net immigration
countries and attract both well- and poorly-educated migrants from the rest of the
world.
Helliwell (1997, 1998) has argued convincingly that \borders matter" both for trade
and for migration. The volume of interprovincial trade in Canada is very high relative
to trade across the US-Canadian border. Furthermore, internal migration in each of
these countries is much larger than migration between the two. There are many reasons
why this may be the case; attachment to home, language, custom, and familiarity
24with social norms may all contribute to greater degrees of economic integration within
countries than is found among them. One could conclude that competition for highly-
skilled human resources should not be a policy priority for Canada or, for that matter,
for the US. No doubt, scal, educational, or other policy reforms cannot be driven
solely by competition for human resources without full consideration of other policy
dimensions. Still, competition for human and other productive resources does exist
and it is worth considering its implications. The following remarks attempt to pull
together some ideas from the discussion in previous sections, focusing on the analysis
of tax and expenditure policies, including higher-education nance, in an integrated
market environment.
5.1 Eciency and Distributional Eects of Integration
The potential benets from trade in goods and services, both within and among coun-
tries, have been thoroughly discussed and do not require additional comment here.
Aside from general gains from trade, benets from greater product variety, economies
of scale, or greater competition, of course, trade is also thought to aect factor prices
and the distribution of income, as mentioned above. Trade is also thought to have
contributed to widening inequality in the distribution of wages22, as well as to in-
creased riskiness of income: openness, it is argued, may expose an economy to more
shocks from uctuations in external markets. The eects of trade on the distribu-
tion and riskiness of income are important for scal policy because large fractions of
government expenditure and major elements of the tax systems in both the US and
Canada, as in all other high-income countries, serve to alter the distribution of income
and of income risk. If trade contributes to greater earnings dispersion, then increased
redistributive interventions by the public sector would be needed if the distribution
of net income is not to become more unequal (see, e.g., Rodrik (1998), Agell (1999,
2000)).
As observed above, factor mobility can contribute to more ecient utilization of exist-
ing resource stocks. Persistent internal migration in the US and Canada has presum-
ably given rise to signicant eciency gains in both economies. International mobility
of labor and capital can likewise contribute to higher productivity. Factor mobility,
like trade, also aects factor returns. In a classical two-factor production function
F(K;L) with output depending solely on capital and labor, factor prices are governed
22The extent to which this is actually the case had been a matter of intense study; Zhu and
Treer (2001) characterize the current state of professional opinion on this topic as a \20% solution"
according to which only about 20% of the recent increase in earnings inequality can be explained by
trade.
25by the capital/labor ratio. In a more general setting with many factors of production,
factor prices, as shown in (1), depend in less predictable ways on factor proportions
because of potentially complex substitute/complement relationships. As noted in Sec-
tion 3, the fact that gross labor ows far exceed net labor ows with the US and
Canada provides evidence that dierent types of labor are not highly substitutable
for one another. In fact, the high degree of mobility of highly-educated individuals
indicates both that high- and low-skilled labor are imperfect substitutes and that dif-
ferent types of high-skilled labor are also imperfect substitutes. For this reason, it is
dicult to predict the distributional impact of factor ows. It may be reasonable to
suppose as a rst approximation, however, that high-skilled labor, capital, low-skilled
labor, and natural resources are generally complementary inputs. For any given type
of labor, mobility reduces disparities in earnings (or, more precisely, real incomes)
among regions. This is true within countries and among countries. If integration of
labor markets leads to higher levels of investment in human capital, it can be expected
to lead to higher returns for complementary inputs, including low-skilled labor.
Increased labor mobility between the US and Canada, and between North America and
the rest of the world, can be mutually benecial, in terms of allocative eciency, for
the same reason that internal migration in both countries contributes to more ecient
resource utilization. Observed migration behavior suggests that the eciency gains
from mobility are particularly important for highly educated workers. The full general-
equilibrium eects of greater factor-market integration for highly-skilled workers are
complex, but, leaving aside for one moment the issue of education nance, greater
opportunities to participate in \large" labor markets would generally be expected to
enhance the lifetime earnings prospects for young people who invest in specialized
skills by reducing their lifetime earnings risk. For both Canadian and US university
students, the option to search for employment in locations beyond state, provincial,
or national boundaries is valuable and contributes to the incentive to obtain higher
education.
5.2 Fiscal Competition: Education Finance and Tax Policy
The scal systems of the US and Canada are extremely complex, and these complex-
ities should be borne in mind when attempting to assess the scal implications of
household mobility. In brief, complexities arise (a) because households interact with
interact with scal systems over their entire life cycles, (b) they interact both with the
expenditure and the revenue elements of scal systems, and (c) they interact simulta-
neously with the scal systems of national, state/provincial, and local governments.
For example, many types of public expenditures { health, education, pensions { are
26directed either toward children or toward elderly people. The bulk of tax and non-
tax revenues are collected principally from people in the middle part of the life cycle.
The distribution of the burdens of taxation and of the benets of public services vary
not only with age but with income, household size and composition, and many other
attributes. This is true both for national and subnational governments. The lifetime
distribution of the benets and burdens of government on dierent types of people is
only imperfectly understood.23
Migration changes the demographic composition of a region, and adds yet another di-
mension to the relationship between the individual and the public sector over the life
cycle. A young person may benet from education provided by local schools and by
state or provincial governments and may then relocate either to other states/provinces
or to another country. This creates a potentially serious problem for the nancing of
higher education, in particular. A jurisdiction that attempts to use high levels of
taxation to nance high levels of education may nd that the beneciaries of educa-
tion spending then migrate to other jurisdictions, reducing the tax base with which
education spending is to be nanced. Indeed, standard models of scal competition
typically lead to the conclusion that a small, open jurisdiction would optimally impose
a zero net scal burden on a freely-mobile resource.
The logic underlying this conclusion is easily illustrated using Figure 1. Suppose that
labor of type i earns an exogenously-xed net return of wi on the external market, and
that the demand for labor type i in region j is given by, say, D
+
ij. In the absence of
any taxes or subsidies, the equilibrium level of employment in this region would be l
+
ij,
assuming that labor is freely mobile. If this region imposes a tax of BE on each unit
of labor, then the equilibrium employment level would be only lij, as the gross wage
for this type of labor rises to w
+
ij. Assuming that immobile resources in the region
are owned by local residents, the loss in income to immobile resources, w
+
ijBFwi, is
greater than the tax revenue collected, w
+
ijBEwi, and real income accruing to people
in the region would fall by BEF.24
Fundamentally, this result { which of course must be qualied when the underlying
assumptions are altered { can be viewed simply as a variant of the standard optimal
tari argument. The same principles explain why it is also optimal for a small jurisdic-
tion not to subsidize mobile resources. Note that these results obtain whether mobile
resources ow into or out of a jurisdiction, and whether the magnitude of observed
23Research on \generational accounting" (see, e.g., Kotliko (1993), Auerbach et al. (1999)) high-
lights the importance of the life-cycle impact of both tax and expenditure policies. In general, trying
to measure the distribution of the benets of public services over the life cycle presents a larger
measurement challenge than is true for taxes or for cash benets such as public pensions.
24See, e.g., Cremer et al. 1996 and Wildasin (1998) for discussion and further references.
27ows is small or large, just as the standard optimal tari argument applies equally to
export taxes, and does not depend on the volume of trade.
Although these observations are analytically extremely obvious, they depart quite
signicantly from many common policy prescriptions. For instance, in the context of
\brain drain" debates, the departure of highly-trained individuals from a jurisdiction
is often viewed as self-evidently a bad outcome. One might then suppose that subsidies
to retain highly-skilled individuals would be an appropriate policy response. In fact,
however, a net subsidy to highly-skilled workers is not an optimal policy, unless one
can show that there are positive externalities associated with the presence of such
individuals. Note that this conclusion applies independently of the size of the local
endowment of labor of type i and, thus, independently of whether labor ows into or
out of the region, whether in large or small amounts. That is, the policy conclusion
follows independently of the observed level of in- or out-migration. The key question
for determining the optimal policy is whether the jurisdiction is small or large relative
to external markets, and whether it is open (or could be made open) to these markets.
With reference to internal migration in the US and Canada, or to migration between
these two countries, the crucial issue is not whether there is positive or negative net
migration into or out of any one province, state, or country, but whether labor markets
among regions are integrated or isolated. The high gross levels of internal migration
within the US and Canada testify to the fact that labor markets within these countries
are signicantly linked. Migration between the US and Canada shows that there are
linkages between the US and Canadian labor markets, though the degree of integration
between the two is at least in part a matter of policy choice and could be enhanced
or diminished by either or both countries, if desired.
The competition for mobile resources is often asserted to lead to a \race to the bot-
tom," which is usually interpreted to mean, for instance, that competition leads to
reductions in taxes. This is in fact not an accurate interpretation of the analysis.
Many public services, especially those such as education, health, and others that re-
late to human resources, exhibit what is known as \congestibility," which is to say
that their cost of provision depends partly on the size of the population being served.
For instance, the total cost of providing education to 1,000 students is far less than the
cost of providing education to 20,000 students { that is, the incremental or marginal
cost of educating one more student is not zero. Indeed, it is commonplace to measure
education costs in terms of cost per student { a crude but useful rst approxima-
tion that implicitly assumes that marginal and average cost are equal. What does
the theory of scal competition suggest should happen to scal systems when public
services exhibit congestibility? It does not imply that taxes are driven toward zero,
any more than perfect competition among rms implies that prices are driven toward
28zero. Rather, net scal burdens, the value of taxes paid by mobile resources net of the
cost of providing them with public services, are driven toward zero. In particular, if
the marginal cost of providing public services to those who use these services is high,
then competition among jurisdictions should lead to high public-sector charges for
those users. In the case of higher education, if students or their parents are relatively
highly mobile, scal competition is expected to lead to greater reliance on student fees
and charges or on other revenue instruments that similarly link revenues with costs.
Fiscal competition would be expected to limit the extent of redistributive nancing of
higher education { that is, the nancing of higher education in ways that allow some
to utilize scarce educational resources that are paid for by others. The most obvious
way in which this can occur is through increased reliance on tuition and fees assessed
by higher-education institutions on currently-enrolled students.
Does this mean that higher education cannot or should not be nanced with standard
revenue instruments, such as income or consumption taxes, when skilled workers are
mobile? Such a conclusion would be unwarranted, at least in an unqualied form, for
at least three reasons.
First, if taxes are not used to nance higher education, what is the alternative? If
students have or can obtain sucient nancial resources to pay the full cost of their own
education, then indeed the case for tax nancing of higher education is substantially
weakened. It might still be argued that higher education provides spillover benets
to the rest of society and that it therefore warrants public-sector support. But, as
estimates of the education premium conrm, a very substantial part of the benet of
investment in higher education accrues to students in the form of higher earnings. If
they are the principal beneciaries of their own education, and if they enjoy relatively
high lifetime incomes, there is little normative justication for the subsidization of
higher education. This supposes, however, that students can, if necessary, borrow the
money needed to nance their education. If they are credit-constrained, the level of
investment in higher education would be ineciently low. The high level of public-
sector expenditure in support of higher education that has developed in Canada and
the US during the past century was undoubtedly predicated, at least in part, on the
assumption that private capital markets would not provide sucient resources for
education. In the presence of such a capital market failure, reliance on public-sector
revenue sources, even ones which give rise to allocative distortions, may be part of an
optimal policy. In eect, the government's revenue system osets the misallocation
that would otherwise result from a \missing market;" the young who benet from
the provision of publicly-supported education in eect repay an implicit loan from the
government through their payment of taxes later in life.25
25In practice, earnings are not taxed at a uniform rate over the life cycle, partly due to progressivity
29Second, even if young and well-educated people are highly mobile, the same is not
necessarily true for older people, including the parents of children who are utiliz-
ing publicly-supported higher-education systems. Although students certainly benet
from being educated, so do their parents, if they are altruistic toward their children.
One can visualize a traditional US or Canadian public university as an institution
through which parents, through their payment of income and other taxes, purchase
higher education for their children. Parents may be relatively immobile and thus
relatively unresponsive, along the migration margin, to local taxes. Furthermore,
if access to publicly-supported higher education is contingent on residence within a
state or province (meaning, traditionally, the residence of a student's parents), then
the net scal burden imposed on parents by publicly-supported higher education may
be rather modest: the burden of taxes is oset by the benet of education for one's
children. In terms of Figure 1, a \tax" of BE is properly interpreted not just as a tax
in the strict sense, but as a net scal burden, i.e., as the burden of location-contingent
taxes net of the location-contingent benets of public services to the individual. To
the extent that the benets of higher education (or other public services) oset the
taxes paid by residents, the size of the \wedge" in the diagram is reduced.
Third, as noted above, the degree of mobility of labor within the US and Canada is
greater than the degree of international mobility. Perhaps the competition for highly-
skilled individuals by states or provinces means that these units of government will
(or, from the perspective of their local constituencies, should) alter their revenue sys-
tems in ways that reduce the net scal burdens falling on those with high earnings. If
these individuals are not particularly mobile internationally, then they can be taxed
more heavily by national governments. The revenues accruing to the national govern-
ments could then be used, if desired, to support higher education. This support could
be directed to public higher-education institutions through direct grants, or through
grants to state and provincial governments on condition that the resources are used
to support public universities. It could also be directed to students through national
student loan or scholarship programs, or to their families, through tax-preferred sav-
ings vehicles, with students then able to use these public-sector resources to defray the
cost of their higher education at whatever institutions, public or private, they might
of rate structures and partly because of ongoing tax reforms. Progressivity of the rate structure, by
itself, tends to discourage investment in human capital, since education raises lifetime variability of
earnings by steepening the life-cycle earnings prole. As observed by Sturn and Wolhfahrt (2000),
however, the \condensing" of earnings over the life cycle means that progressive taxation shifts tax
burdens toward more-educated members of the population, thus recouping some of the subsidies to
education received earlier in the life cycle. They argue that progressive tax systems thereby recoup
signicant portions of the subsidies to education that are made available in early stages of the life
cycle, meaning that publicly-supported higher education, in the presence of progressive tax systems,
has smaller redistributive impacts than might otherwise appear to be the case.
30attend. Indeed, nancial support of this latter type is found both in the US and
Canada. In other words, interprovincial or interstate scal competition could lead to
an upward-reassignment of public-sector responsibility for higher-education nance {
that is, to a restructuring of public-sector nancing roles among levels of government
within a country.
While one should not exaggerate the importance of the competition for human re-
sources for the structuring of education nance and for revenue systems, gradual
changes in the degree of economic integration within North America as well as with
respect to the rest of the world may create pressures for policy change. Compared
to the period immediately after World War II, which saw a large expansion of the
public-sector role in higher education, the opportunities for purely private nancing
of higher education have certainly increased. Economic growth has led to increases
in wealth that leave many families much better equipped to pay for higher education
for their children. Financial institutions provide much better opportunities for many
students to borrow the resources necessary to nance their education, especially with
support from national (and sometimes subnational) governments in the form of loan
guarantees or other incentives, and, as noted above, a variety of tax preferences and
savings incentives help families to accumulate resources with which to nance higher
education for their. These developments presumably reduce the importance of keeping
tuition and fees at low levels.
Of course, the observed trends in higher-education nance also reect underlying de-
mand and supply conditions. The private return to human capital investment { often
measured by the \education premium," that is, the higher earnings enjoyed by better-
educated workers { aects the incentive for young people to pursue higher education
and thus the market environment within which higher-education institutions operate.
Freeman and Needles (1993) nd that the education premium has risen markedly in
US and, to a lesser extent, in Canada, during the 1980s. The ratio of college- to high-
school-educated fell somewhat in US, a \lagged response to decline in enrollments
induced by falling return to college of the 1970s," while rising in Canada. According
to Riddell and Sweetman (1999, p. 28), referring to the Canadian experience of the
past decade, \[d]espite the substantial growth in the number of well-educated workers,
and the decline in the supply of those with low levels of education, the relative earn-
ings of university and college graduates did not fall relative to the less well-educated
groups. [] We interpret this evidence to suggest that the demand for more educated
workers has increased substantially over this period, suciently to absorb the large
increase in their supply..."26 In such an environment, it is not surprising, perhaps, to
see increases in tuition and fees for higher education. This is true independently of
26For further discussion of Canadian and US labor markets, see Riddell (1999).
31any pressures arising from scal competition among provinces or states.
Changes in the demand for and supply of highly-skilled workers in the US and Canada
also aect earnings dierentials between the US and Canada, as well as with respect
to the rest of the world. Cet. par., rising in equality in the US relative to Canada
would strengthen the incentives for highly-skilled Canadians to move to the US. What
of the international competition for human resources?
The brain drain debate often tends to view international migration as a zero-sum phe-
nomenon, and, without doubt, net migration ows are potentially important. As has
been emphasized above, however, migration can be productivity-enhancing. The fact
that higher education oers opportunities for employment on an international scale
certainly increases the demand for higher education, even for countries that are net
importers of highly-skilled workers. It is also worth noting that gross international mi-
gration ows are larger than net ows, though to a degree that is not easily measured.
In general, resource ows international boundaries suggest gains from trade. Further-
more, the possibility of return migration should not be underestimated. A series of
recent studies on Irish migration by Barrett (2002), Barrett et al. (2000), and Barrett
and O'Connell (2001) show that Ireland, traditionally a country that lost many work-
ers to emigration, including well-educated ones, has recently experienced substantial
return migration, especially of high-skilled workers. These workers have enjoyed sub-
stantial gains in earnings relative to those who have stayed in Ireland, suggesting that
migration has been productivity-enhancing for those who move.27 Furthermore, their
return to Ireland appears to have reduced the earnings premium enjoyed by high-
skilled workers there. In the Irish case, at least, return migration has meant that the
amount of permanent international migration has turned out to be smaller than the
amount of temporary migration. Similar migration patterns across the Canada-US
border, as indeed is observed across state and provincial boundaries within the US
and Canada, can easily be imagined. Policy changes that liberalize migration across
international borders presumably give rise to \gains from trade" even as they may
increase the competitive pressures on national and subnational scal systems.
Although it is an issue with ramications that go well beyond the \brain drain" de-
bate, the tax treatment of highly-skilled individuals is often discussed in this context.
More denitive analysis must await further investigation, but there is no doubt that
the tax treatment of high-income individuals provides potentially fertile ground for
intergovernmental competition because these individuals have such a large impact on
27This contrasts with the ndings reported by Finnie (2001b) which show that internal migrants in
Canada { especially young males { generally benet from increased earnings, but that interprovincial
return migration in Canada may actually be associated with earnings losses. These studies are not
directly comparable in detail, however, and are not necessarily inconsistent.
32government revenues. By way of illustration, in 1999, the top 1.9% of taxpayers re-
ceived 24.4% of income28; the top 0.16% of taxpayers received 11.2% of income. These
gures testify to the degree of concentration of income in the US. The distribution of
taxes is even more concentrated: the top 1.9% of taxpayers paid 43.4% of all personal
income taxes (the major revenue source for the Federal government, along with the
payroll tax for social security), and the top 0.16% of taxpayers paid 20.8% of these
taxes. These very rich taxpayers paid an average income tax of almost $900,000. The
jurisdiction that succeeds in attracting such taxpayers is sure to enjoy a vast scal
benet. As a simple back-of-the envelope calculation, if half of the top 0.16% of tax-
payers in the US in 1999 (about 100,000 taxpayers) had located in, say, Monaco, the
US would have lost about 10% of all personal income tax revenues { about $90 billion,
much more than the entire proceeds of the estate tax and equal to about half of all
corporation income tax revenue. These gures are very rough but demonstrate clearly
that the locational choices of high-income individuals are a matter of importance, in
terms of scal policy, far out of proportion to the numbers of such people, and it is
therefore not unreasonable to argue that governments at all levels (both national and
subnational) either will or should adapt their scal systems (or other policies) in ways
that attract high-income individuals.29
These competitive pressures exist both at the international and subnational levels.
Insofar as households are more mobile within countries, scal competition may be
\more intense" for subnational governments. One might accordingly expect to see
\upward reassignment" of redistributive policies, with national governments playing
an increased role in providing nancial support for students of modest means in search
of higher education, accompanied by reductions in the amount of nancial aid oered
by subnational governments.30 The trends in higher-education nance described in
Section 4 might be oered, tentatively, as evidence of this sort of policy change.
28Specically, \adjusted gross income," or AGI, which is related but certainly not identical to true
economic income. These gures are drawn from the US Treasury's Statistics of Income.
29It should perhaps be emphasized in this context that the key issue concerns the location, for tax
purposes, of the incomes of the rich, which may or may not be where they spend 180 or so days per
year. Discussion of scal competition in all of its aspects, including not only the tax treatment of
high-income individuals but of corporations, and of expenditure policies that benet dierent types
of households and business activity, goes beyond the scope of the present paper, however. For further
discussion and references, see Wildasin (2002).
30Determining the \degree of competition" for mobile resources is a dicult task, both conceptually
and empirically. In this writer's view, explicit dynamic modeling of factor reallocations may provide
the most fruitful avenue of approach to this issue (see Wildasin (forthcoming)). Decressin and Fatas
(1995) provide an interesting empirical comparison of the \degree of labor mobility" between the US
and Europe, focusing on the speed of labor-market adjustment to changing demand conditions.
335.3 Scope for Additional Research
The foregoing discussion has touched on a large number of inter-related issues, in-
cluding trade in goods and services within and among countries and its implications
for factor markets and incomes; internal migration within the US and Canada and its
implications for ecient resource allocation, the distribution of income, and income
risk; the incentives to invest in higher education and the nancing of higher educa-
tion by national and subnational governments as well as by private individuals; the
possible eects of scal competition on the nancing of higher education and on the
allocation of human resources among regions, both within and among countries. Many
theoretical and empirical studies have contributed to a better understanding of these
issues, but very substantial gaps remain.
The preceding discussion has identied several of these. Further analysis of the alloca-
tive and distributional eects of migration with heterogeneous workers would improve
our understanding of the role of integrated labor markets. A fully satisfactory analysis
cannot limit attention purely to the eects of migration on labor markets, but should
also consider the impact of labor market integration on the allocation of and return
to other factors of production, notably capital and natural resources. The implica-
tions of labor mobility for human capital investment are far from well understood.
The interaction of labor markets with scal systems, including both tax systems and
systems of higher education nance, should be investigated more fully in light of a
more complete understanding of the role of internal and international labor mobility.
Progress in these areas would contribute substantially to a better foundation for the
analysis of the very complex policy issues that both Canada and the US must address
as economic integration proceeds.
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Sales and ServicesTABLE 1
Population 5 Years and Over, Showing Mobility Status 
(Number, Place of Residence 5 Years Ago)




Total 24,927,870 524,845 117,490 823,850 664,585 6,319,430 9,225,700 984,125
Non-movers  13,290,690 375,885 76,915 510,660 436,200 3,564,470 4,797,795 557,525
Movers  11,637,180 148,955 40,570 313,190 228,385 2,754,960 4,427,905 426,595
  Non-
migrants  5,776,215 76,565 17,770 165,140 120,000 1,382,255 2,098,400 275,780
  Migrants  5,860,970 72,390 22,805 148,050 108,385 1,372,710 2,329,505 150,815
    Internal 
migrants 4,947,645 69,710 21,825 139,410 102,990 1,230,860 1,831,825 126,305
      Intraprov
incial 
migrants 3,970,595 48,975 13,035 86,150 67,155 1,148,865 1,561,840 82,255
      Interprov
incial 
migrants 977,050 20,735 8,785 53,260 35,825 81,995 269,985 44,050
    External 
migrants 913,320 2,680 980 8,640 5,400 141,845 497,675 24,510
1996
Total 26,604,135 516,455 123,790 843,750 685,045 6,588,580 9,904,595 1,019,590
Non-movers  15,079,410 378,840 84,150 539,825 461,660 3,962,295 5,635,420 612,580
Movers  11,524,725 137,615 39,640 303,925 223,385 2,626,285 4,269,180 407,010
  Non-
migrants  6,130,740 75,370 20,355 178,680 125,735 1,407,750 2,252,460 265,965
  Migrants  5,393,985 62,240 19,285 125,245 97,650 1,218,535 2,016,725 141,050
    Internal 
migrants 4,465,295 59,560 18,595 115,810 92,215 1,078,625 1,561,110 121,565
      Intraprov
incial 
migrants 3,575,025 43,335 9,650 68,355 58,155 1,009,725 1,367,090 78,350
      Interprov
incial 
migrants 890,270 16,225 8,945 47,455 34,060 68,895 194,020 43,215
    External 
migrants 928,690 2,680 690 9,435 5,435 139,910 455,615 19,485
Canada Newfdld.
Source: Statistics Canada, 1996 Census Nation tables
Quebec Ontario ManitobaTABLE 1 (cont.)
Population 5 Years and Over, Showing Mobility Status 
(Number, Place of Residence 5 Years Ago)




Total 891,255 2,291,065 3,011,330 24,785 49,400
Non-movers  544,015 1,081,105 1,320,285 8,775 17,045
Movers  347,240 1,209,965 1,691,050 16,010 32,355
  Non-
migrants  189,410 668,220 757,890 7,295 17,500
  Migrants  157,830 541,745 933,160 8,715 14,855
    Internal 
migrants 149,235 466,860 786,125 8,270 14,235
      Intraprov
incial 
migrants 111,015 296,840 547,945 1,810 4,695
      Interprov
incial 
migrants 38,220 170,015 238,175 6,460 9,540
    External 
migrants 8,595 74,890 147,035 440 620
1996
Total 906,355 2,474,850 3,456,245 28,310 56,560
Non-movers  556,695 1,244,925 1,570,900 11,805 20,320
Movers  349,660 1,229,925 1,885,345 16,505 36,240
  Non-
migrants  191,375 705,835 877,170 8,330 21,715
  Migrants  158,285 524,090 1,008,170 8,170 14,530
    Internal 
migrants 148,580 453,845 793,650 7,795 13,945
      Intraprov
incial 
migrants 101,055 291,200 541,025 1,840 5,230
      Interprov
incial 
migrants 47,520 162,645 252,625 5,955 8,710
    External 
migrants 9,710 70,250 214,520 375 590
Alberta Yukon Sask.TABLE 2
Population 5 Years and Over, Showing Mobility Status 
(Percentage, Place of Residence 5 Years Ago)




Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Non-movers  53% 72% 65% 62% 66% 56% 52% 57%
Movers  47% 28% 35% 38% 34% 44% 48% 43%
  Non-
migrants  23% 15% 15% 20% 18% 22% 23% 28%
  Migrants  24% 14% 19% 18% 16% 22% 25% 15%
    Internal 
migrants 20% 13% 19% 17% 15% 19% 20% 13%
      Intraprovi
ncial 
migrants 16% 9% 11% 10% 10% 18% 17% 8%
      Interprovi
ncial 
migrants 4% 4% 7% 6% 5% 1% 3% 4%
    External 
migrants 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 5% 2%
1996
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Non-movers  57% 73% 68% 64% 67% 60% 57% 60%
Movers  43% 27% 32% 36% 33% 40% 43% 40%
  Non-
migrants  23% 15% 16% 21% 18% 21% 23% 26%
  Migrants  20% 12% 16% 15% 14% 18% 20% 14%
    Internal 
migrants 17% 12% 15% 14% 13% 16% 16% 12%
      Intraprovi
ncial 
migrants 13% 8% 8% 8% 8% 15% 14% 8%
      Interprovi
ncial 
migrants 3% 3% 7% 6% 5% 1% 2% 4%
    External 
migrants 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 5% 2%
Source: Table 1. 
Ontario Manitoba Canada Newfdld. QuebecTABLE 2 (cont.)
Population 5 Years and Over, Showing Mobility Status 
(Percentage, Place of Residence 5 Years Ago)




Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Non-movers  61% 47% 44% 35% 35%
Movers  39% 53% 56% 65% 65%
  Non-
migrants  21% 29% 25% 29% 35%
  Migrants  18% 24% 31% 35% 30%
    Internal 
migrants 17% 20% 26% 33% 29%
      Intrapro
vincial 
migrants 12% 13% 18% 7% 10%
      Interpro
vincial 
migrants 4% 7% 8% 26% 19%
    External 
migrants 1% 3% 5% 2% 1%
1996
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Non-movers  61% 50% 45% 42% 36%
Movers  39% 50% 55% 58% 64%
  Non-
migrants  21% 29% 25% 29% 38%
  Migrants  17% 21% 29% 29% 26%
    Internal 
migrants 16% 18% 23% 28% 25%
      Intrapro
vincial 
migrants 11% 12% 16% 6% 9%
      Interpro
vincial 
migrants 5% 7% 7% 21% 15%
    External 
migrants 1% 3% 6% 1% 1%
Sask.TABLE 3
Population 1 Year and Over, Showing Mobility Status, 1996 
(Number and Percentage, Place of Residence 1 Year Ago)
For Canada, Provinces, and Territories
Number
Canada Newfdld. Nova New Quebec Ontario Manitoba
PEI Scotia Brunswick
Total 28,155,225 541,630 131,050 888,835 721,070 6,958,710 10,496,475 1,084,900
    External 
migrants 228,695 1,000 275 2,890 1,510 37,275 104,335 5,275
      Interprovi
ncial 
migrants 293,340 7,285 3,440 17,155 12,710 25,410 67,080 15,615
      Intraprovi
ncial 
migrants 1,290,150 18,410 3,795 28,470 24,330 352,880 479,750 30,220
  Non-
migrants  2,540,400 32,440 8,890 77,920 55,760 537,505 896,995 108,975
Non-movers  23,802,645 482,490 114,650 762,395 626,760 6,005,650 8,948,305 924,815
Percentage
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
    External 
migrants 0.81% 0.18% 0.21% 0.33% 0.21% 0.54% 0.99% 0.49%
      Interprovi
ncial 
migrants 1.04% 1.35% 2.62% 1.93% 1.76% 0.37% 0.64% 1.44%
      Intraprovi
ncial 
migrants 4.58% 3.40% 2.90% 3.20% 3.37% 5.07% 4.57% 2.79%
  Non-
migrants  9.02% 5.99% 6.78% 8.77% 7.73% 7.72% 8.55% 10.04%
Non-movers  84.54% 89.08% 87.49% 85.77% 86.92% 86.30% 85.25% 85.24%
Source: Statistics CanadaTABLE 3 (Cont.)
Population 1 Year and Over, Showing Mobility Status, 1996 
(Number and Percentage, Place of Residence 1 Year Ago)
For Canada, Provinces, and Territories
Number
Sask. Alberta British Yukon
Columbia NW Terr.
Total 963,305 2,631,835 3,644,505 30,220 62,680
    External 
migrants 3,675 18,730 53,415 170 140
      Interpro
vincial 
migrants 18,255 54,690 66,205 2,360 3,130
      Intrapro
vincial 
migrants 40,300 112,285 196,280 745 2,670
  Non-
migrants  90,235 310,395 406,395 4,095 10,795
Non-movers  810,840 2,135,735 2,922,205 22,855 45,945
Percentage
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
    External 
migrants 0.38% 0.71% 1.47% 0.56% 0.22%
      Interpro
vincial 
migrants 1.90% 2.08% 1.82% 7.81% 4.99%
      Intrapro
vincial 
migrants 4.18% 4.27% 5.39% 2.47% 4.26%
  Non-
migrants  9.37% 11.79% 11.15% 13.55% 17.22%
Non-movers  84.17% 81.15% 80.18% 75.63% 73.30%TABLE 4
Inter-Regional Migration in the United States, 1980--2000
Selected Years
Mobility period and type  Northeast  Midwest  South  West
1999-2000
Inmigrants.............................. 363 722 1,258 763
Outmigrants............................. 615 640 1,031 820
Net internal migration................ -252 82 227 -57
Movers from abroad...................... 292 238 612 604
Net migration (including abroad)...... 40 320 839 547
Population 53594 64393 100237 63198
1989-90
Inmigrants.............................. 461 908 1,428 964
Outmigrants............................. 758 1,024 1,198 781
Net internal migration................ -297 -116 230 183
Movers from abroad...................... 328 169 500 562
Net migration (including abroad)...... 31 53 730 745
Population 50809 59668 85446 52786
1980-81
Inmigrants.............................. 464 650 1,377 871
Outmigrants............................. 706 1,056 890 710
Net internal migration................ -242 -406 487 161
Movers from abroad...................... 207 180 412 514
Net migration (including abroad)...... -35 -226 899 675
Population 49137 58867 75367 43171
Source: US Bureau of the Census.  All figures in thousands. TABLE 5
Migration Rates in the United States, 1980--2000
Selected Years
Mobility period and type Northeast  Midwest  South  West
1999-2000
Inmigrants.............................. 0.68% 1.12% 1.26% 1.21%
Outmigrants............................. 1.15% 0.99% 1.03% 1.30%
Net internal migration................ -0.47% 0.13% 0.23% -0.09%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.54% 0.37% 0.61% 0.96%
Net migration (including abroad)...... 0.07% 0.50% 0.84% 0.87%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 1.82% 2.12% 2.28% 2.50%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -3.88 16.61 10.08 -27.77
1989-90
Inmigrants.............................. 0.91% 1.52% 1.67% 1.83%
Outmigrants............................. 1.49% 1.72% 1.40% 1.48%
Net internal migration................ -0.58% -0.19% 0.27% 0.35%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.65% 0.28% 0.59% 1.06%
Net migration (including abroad)...... 0.06% 0.09% 0.85% 1.41%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 2.40% 3.24% 3.07% 3.31%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -4.10 -16.66 11.42 9.54
1980-81
Inmigrants.............................. 0.94% 1.10% 1.83% 2.02%
Outmigrants............................. 1.44% 1.79% 1.18% 1.64%
Net internal migration................ -0.49% -0.69% 0.65% 0.37%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.42% 0.31% 0.55% 1.19%
Net migration (including abroad)...... -0.07% -0.38% 1.19% 1.56%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 2.38% 2.90% 3.01% 3.66%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -4.83 -4.20 4.66 9.82
Source: Table 4.TABLE 6
Frequency of Moves between 1979 and 1996
 By Educational Attainment, NLSY Sample 
College  More Than
High School High School Some  Graduate College 
Percent Moving per Period  (a) Dropout Only College Only Graduate
Betwween States 5.3 5.3 6.4 8.7 10.2
Between Noncontiguous States 3.6 4 4.7 6 7.6
Between Census Divisions  3.5 4.1 4.7 6.3 7.8
Source: Kodrzycki (2001), Table 2, based on National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. 
(a) Annually, except for period 1994-1996.TABLE 7
Five-Year Migration Rates across Census Divisions, 
College Graduates
1979 to 1991, NLSY Sample
A. By High School Location
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Census Division In-Migration Out-Migration Net Migration
New England 19.5 29.9 -10.4
Middle Atlantic 19.3 20.5 -1.2
East North Central 9.8 25.6 -15.9
West North Central 13.2 27.4 -14.2
South Atlantic 32.9 19.2 13.8
East South Central 23.5 35.3 -11.8
West South Central 23.6 19.4 4.2
Mountain 69.4 36.1 33.3
Pacific 52.6 10.5 42.1
United States 23.5 23.5 0
B.  By College Location
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Census Division In-Migration Out-Migration Net Migration
New England  16.4 20.5 -4.1
Middle Atlantic 15.6 13.8 1.8
East North Central  17.3 23.2 -5.9
West North Central 14.7 25.5 -10.8
South Atlantic 27.5 15 12.6
East South Central 21.3 25.5 -4.3
West South Central 10.9 28.3 -17.4
Mountain 42.5 25 17.5
Pacific 26.3 11.6 14.7
United States 19.8 19.8 0
Sample Size = 1003
Source: Adapted from Kodrzycki (2001), Table 3, based on National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. TABLE 8
Revenues of Canadian Universities, 1994--199
1994/95 1998/99 1999/2000
Total revenue 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Government grants and contracts
   Federal 9.1% 8.3% 8.9%
   Provincial 53.3% 46.2% 45.3%
   Municipal and other 0.4% 0.7% 0.7%
Total 62.8% 55.2% 55.0%
Student fees 16.0% 20.3% 19.3%
Bequests, donations, non-gov't grants/contracts 8.0% 9.7% 9.5%
Sales of services and products 8.6% 8.4% 9.1%
Investment revenue 2.6% 3.5% 3.7%
Miscellaneous 2.0% 2.9% 3.6%